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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BASIN FLYING SERVICE, 
Protestant-Appellant, 
vs. 
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, 
DINALAND AVIATION, INCOR-
PORATED and FLAMING GORGE 
FLYING SERVICE, 
Respondents-Appellees. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
FLAMING GORGE FLYING SERVICE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from an order of the Public Service 
Commission of Utah which ruled that the non-scheduled 
intrastate air carrier service offered by appellee Dinaland 
Aviation was not subject to regulation by that Commis-
sion. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Public Service Commission ruled appellee Dina-
land Aviation's non-scheduled air carrier service could 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant seeks to have the order of the Public 
Service Commission reversed and have this court hold 
that all intrastate air carriers are subject to regulation 
by the Public Service Commission. 
F A C T S 
Prior to October 1973, the Public Service Commis-
sion of Utah (hereinafter referred to as Commission) 
served upon appellee Dinaland Aviation (hereinafter re-
ferred to as Dinaland) an Order to Show Cause why it 
shouldn't be required to obtain a Certificate of Conven-
ience and Necessity from the Commission in order to 
continue its business. In conjunction therewith, an Order 
to Show Cause was also issued by the Commission against 
appellee Flaming Gorge Flying Service (hereafter Flam-
ing Gorge), ordering it to show cause why action should 
not be taken against it for alleged misuse of the Certifi-
cate of Convenience and Necessity which it holds under 
the authority of the Commission. 
Dinaland filed an application for a Certificate of 
Convenience and Necessity which contained a prayer and 
allegation asking that the Commission find itself without 
authority to regulate the charter service engaged in by it, 
which consists of air taxi service over irregular routes at 
irregular times on an on-call basis. Flaming Gorge con-
ducts a similar type of business, and both appellees oper-
ate in the Northeastern Utah area. 
Both matters were consolidated for hearing, and on 
December 13, 1973, the Order to Show Cause which had 
2 
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issued against Flaming Gorge was dismissed for lack of 
evidence. However, Flaming Gorge was given leave to 
continue its appearance in this matter with regard to the 
question of the Commission's authority to regulate the 
particular type of charter service offered by Flaming 
Gorge and Dinaland. 
Basin Flying Service (hereinafter referred to as Basin) 
entered an appearance as a protestant to Dinaland's appli-
cation at this hearing, and the matter of the application 
of Dinaland was continued without date with the Com-
mission taking under advisement the following two is-
sues, as stated on page 2 of the Commission's Investiga-
tion Docket No. 151, Report and Order, dated April 25, 
1974: 
(1) Whether this Commission has jurisdic-
tion to regulate the service provided by respond-
ent, Dinaland Aviation Incorporated, on March 
8,1973; and 
(2) If this Commission has jurisdiction, 
whether Dinaland Aviation Incorporated violated 
the laws of the State of Utah and the rules and 
regulations of this Commission in regard to the 
service performed by said respondent on March 
8,1973. 
The service performed on March 8, 1973, to which 
the Commission refers is described on page 2 of the Com-
mission's Report and Order of April 25, 1974, as follows: 
2. On March 8, 1973, respondent provided 
a non-scheduled charter flight from Vernal, Utah 
Airport to Salt Lake City, Utah transporting for 
hire a member of the general public. 
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The Commission's Report and Order of April 25, 
1974, held that the Commission did not have jurisdiction 
to regulate the service provided by Dinaland, and that 
the proceeding should be dismissed with prejudice. (Re-
port and Order of April 25,1974, p. 5). 
A petition for rehearing was filed by Basin, and was 
denied by order of the Commission dated June 26, 1974. 
Following an appeal to this court, a motion for dismissal 
was then made by Dinaland on October 21, 1974, which 
motion was denied. 
A R G U M E N T 
POINT I: THE FINDINGS OF THE PUBLIC 
SERVICE COMMISSION ARE PRESUMED 
VALID AND CORRECT AND THIS COURT 
MUST SURVEY THE EVIDENCE IN THE 
LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO SUSTAIN-
ING THOSE FINDINGS. 
Section 54-7-16 U.C.A. (1953), provides in part when 
defining the jurisdiction of this court to hear appeals 
from decisions of the Commission: 
. . . The review {by the Supreme Court} shall 
not be extended further than to determine whether 
the Commission has regularly pursued its author-
ity, including a determination of whether the order 
or decision under review violates any right of the 
petitioner under the Constitution of the United 
States or of the State of Utah. 
In the recent case of Lewis v. Wycoff Co., 18 Utah 
2d 255, 420 P.2d 264 (1966), this court was asked on 
4 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
appeal to reverse an order of the Commission which 
granted an increase in the authority of Wycoff, as a com-
mon carrier, to include emergency shipments of con-
tractors' supplies between all points in Utah. In affirm-
ing the Commission's ruling, this court stated: 
Due to the responsibility imposed upon the 
Commission and its presumed knowledge and ex-
pertise in this field, its findings and order are 
supported by certain well-recognized rules of re-
view. They are endorsed with a presumption of 
validity and correctness; and the burden is upon 
the plaintiff to show that they are in error. We 
survey the evidence in the light most favorable 
to sustaining them; and we will not reverse unless 
there is no reasonable basis therein to support 
them so that it appears that the Commission's ac-
tion was capricious and arbitrary. (420 P.2d at p. 
266). 
See also Salt Lake Transfer Co. v. Public Service 
Commission, 11 U.2d 121, 355 P.2d 706 (I960), and 
Union Pac. R. Co. v. Public Service Commission, 102 
Utah 465, 132 P.2d 128 (1942). 
The Commission in the instant case concluded that 
Dinaland was a non-scheduled air carrier and as such 
was not subject to the authority of the Commission. Ample 
evidence to support this finding exists in the Record on 
Appeal, and since Utah law clearly requires this conclu-
sion to be surveyed in a light most favorable to sustain-
ing it, this is not an appropriate case for overturning the 
Commission's findings. 
5 
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POINT II: APPELLEE DINALAND AVIA-
TION INCORPORATED IS NOT A SCHED-
ULED AIR CARRIER. 
The appellant has failed to discuss thoroughly the 
issue of what exactly makes a carrier "scheduled" or 
"non-scheduled", although in both Points I and II of its 
brief it has touched upon this issue somewhat. Since 
whether or not the Appellees are scheduled or non-sched-
uled carriers is basic to a decision in this matter, the 
issue deserves some attention. 
In Thompson v. Fidelity and Casualty Co. of New 
York, 148 N.E. 2d 9, cert, denied, 358 U.S. 837, 79 S.Ct. 
62, 3 L.Ed.2d 74 (111. 1958), the plaintiff, beneficiary of 
an insurance policy taken out by her deceased husband 
who had died in an airplane crash brought suit against 
the defendant insurance company when they refused to 
pay on the policy. The defendant contended at trial that 
its policy covered the deceased only if he was flying on 
a "scheduled air carrier", and the plaintiff argued in 
turn that the deceased had been on such an air carrier 
at the time of his death. The facts showed that the de-
ceased had been flying on a plane owned by Peninsular 
Air Transport Company, a partnership which operated 
four aircraft. Peninsular did not maintain scheduled 
flights, file schedules or tariffs for any regular passen-
ger service, and did not hold itself out as maintaining 
any regular schedule of flights. The aircraft in question 
had flown from Miami, Florida to Richmond, Virginia 
on November 13 (the crash occurred on November 17), 
and from that point proceeded with passengers to Ta-
coma, Washington. From there, it flew to Seattle, where 
6 
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it stayed until the 17th in order to obtain some passen-
gers for a flight. On November 17, the plane left Seattle 
carrying military troops who were all individually tick-
eted passengers, and at this time crashed on takeoff, kill-
ing plaintiff's decedent. On the date of the crash, Penin-
sular had no regularly scheduled flights from Seattle to 
any other point in the United States. 
The trial court granted plaintiff's motion for a di-
rected verdict at the close of all the evidence, and from 
the judgment entered upon such verdict the defendant 
appealed. The appellate court reversed, ruling that a 
directed verdict should have been entered for the defend-
ant on the grounds that Peninsular was not a scheduled 
aircraft carrier. The court stated in the course of its 
opinion: 
There is nothing ambiguous about the term 
scheduled air carrier. This term has a clear and 
concise meaning and when defined by any stand-
ard it simply denotes an air carrier which oper-
ates and holds itself out to the public that it does 
operate aircraft designated points regularly, or 
with a reasonable degree of regularity, pursuant 
to a scheduled previously announced. We are 
not unmindful of the fact that words have mean-
ings and different significations to different people 
on different occasions or under various and dif-
ferent circumstances, but we cannot perceive how 
the term scheduled air carrier can have other than 
one meaning; that being an air carrier which op-
erates aircraft between designated points regu-
larly in accordance with previously announced 
schedules. (148 N.E.2d at p. 15). 
In Eveready Freight Service, Inc. v. Public Utilities 
Comm., 449 P.2d 642 (Colo. 1969), the plaintiff Eveready 
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filed an application with the Colorado Public Service 
Commission, stating a rate for the transportation of sodium 
silicate from Climax, Colorado to Urad, Colorado. Den-
ver-Climax Truck Lines, Inc., intervened, protesting that 
Eveready's Certificate of Convenience and Necessity con-
tained a provision which prohibited Eveready from com-
peting with "scheduled operations of presently existing" 
carriers. Eveready contended that Denver-Climax was not 
engaged in scheduled operations, but the Commission ruled 
in favor of Denver-Climax, holding that it was a "sched-
uled line haul common carrier." Eveready appealed to the 
Colorado Supreme Court, and the court reversed the Com-
mission's decision, saying: 
The Commission's finding that Denver-Climax is 
a scheduled line haul common carrier is not the 
same as a finding that Denver-Climax is conduct-
ing scheduled operations within the meaning of 
the Eveready's Certificate. (449 P.2d at p. 643). 
The court continued: 
It seems clear to us that any definition of sched-
uled operations must entail the concept of service 
on a regular time schedule previously announced 
as to time of departure and arrival between defi-
nitely established points regardless of whether 
there are passengers or freight to be carried. (449 
P.2d at p. 644). 
Clearly Dinaland's operation is not that of a sched-
uled carrier; it publishes no schedviles, does not fly regular 
routes pursuant to pre-published schedules, and certainly 
does not fly planes without payloads. Persons may charter 
a plane and set a definite departure time for that particular 
flight, but Dinaland runs no regular route between defi-
8 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
nite points by any stretch of the imagination. Dinaland's 
planes do not fly unless someone has hired one of them 
for a particular job, and then the planes go when and 
where the customer desires. A more classic example of a 
non-scheduled carrier, according to both legal precedent 
and common sense, is difficult to imagine. 
POINT III 
THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION IS 
WITHOUT AUTHORITY TO REGULATE 
APPELLEE DINALAND AVIATION IN-
CORPORATED AND OTHER NON-SCHED-
ULED AIR CARRIERS. 
Chapter 4 of Title 54, U.C.A. (1953), grants the 
Commission authority over public utilities operating in 
Utah. The general jurisdiction of the Commission is stated 
in Section 54-4-1, which states: 
General jurisdiction — The Commission is hereby 
vested with power and jurisdiction to supervise 
and regulate every public utility in this state, and 
to supervise all of the business of every such pub-
lic utility in this state, and to do all things, wheth-
er herein specifically designated, or in addition 
thereto, which are necessary or convenient in the 
exercise of such power and jurisdiction. (Emphasis 
added.) 
Section 54-2-1(30), U.C.A. (1953) defines "public 
utility" as follows: 
The term public utility includes every common 
carrier, gas corporation, electrical corporation, tele-
phone corporation, telegraph corporation, water 
corporation, sewerage corporation, heat corpora-
9 
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tion and warehouseman where the service is per-
formed for, or the commodity delivered to, the 
public generally, . . . (Emphasis added). 
Section 54-2-1(14) defines common carrier as follows: 
The term common carrier includes every railroad 
corporation; street railroad corporation; automo-
bile corporation; scheduled aircraft carrier (corpo-
ration); aerial bucket tramway corporation; ex-
press corporation; dispatch sleeping, dining, draw-
ing-room, freight, refrigerator, oil stock and fruit 
car corporation; freight line, car loaning, car rent-
ing, car loading and every other car corporation; 
and person; . . . (Emphasis added). 
Finally, Section 54-2-1(29) defines aircraft carrier: 
The term aircraft carrier includes every corpora-
tion and person and lessee, trustee and receivers or 
trustees appointed by any court whatsoever, operat-
ing for public service for hire engaged in intrastate 
transportation of persons or property; except those 
air carriers operating with a certificate of conven-
ience and necessity issued by the federal govern-
ment. 
Even though the term "aircraft carrier" is broad 
enough as defined under Utah law to include Dinaland, 
the legislature included in the definition of common car-
rier only scheduled air carriers. This definition then does 
not include Dinaland, a non-scheduled carrier, and since 
it is not a common carrier, then it can't be a public utility, 
and since the Commission may regulate only public utili-
ties, it follows that Dinaland may not be regulated at all 
by the Commission. 
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Appellant devotes a substantial portion of its brief 
(Point I, pp. 7-9) to citing cases, none of them from Utah, 
which define and discuss the term "common carrier." Such 
argument is not relevant to the issues of the instant case, 
since Section 54-2-1(14) provides a statutory definition 
of this term, and the decisions of other jurisdictions on 
the point of the definition of the term common carrier 
are not helpful in the fact of a particular Utah statute 
which provides a definition for the phrase as it is used in 
conjunction with the authority of the Commission. 
The real crux of the instant appeal is not an argument 
over the definition of "common carrier", but may more 
accurately be characterized as a conflict between two 
statutes, 54-2-1(14) (supra) and 54-4-25, both of which 
were amended in 1969. Section 54-4-25 is the specific 
statute providing for issuance of Certificates of Conven-
ience and Necessity by the Commission and reads in part 
as follows: 
54-4-25. Certificates of Convenience and Neces-
sity prerequisite to construction and operation — 
Certificates issued to electrical corporations brought 
under act — Aircraft Carriers. — (1) No railroad 
corporation, street railroad corporation, aerial 
bucket tramway corporation, gas corporation, elec-
tric corporation, telephone corporation, telegraph 
corporation, heat corporation, automobile corpo-
ration, aircraft carrier (corporation), water corpo-
ration or sewage corporation shall henceforth 
establish, or begin construction or operation of a 
railroad, street railroad, aerial bucket tramway, 
line, route, plant or system or any extension of 
such railroad, street railroad, aerial bucket tram-
way line, route, plant or system without having 
first obtained from the Commission a certificate 
11 
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that present or future public convenience and 
necessity does or will require such construction; 
. . . (Emphasis added). 
The appellee, in Point II of its brief, argues that this 
statute, which does not use the phrase f'scheduled aircraft 
carrier," requires all aircraft carriers to obtain Certifi-
cates of Convenience and Necessity. Such reasoning is 
faulty for two reasons: (1) it is contrary to the statutory 
scheme of Title 54 and the intent of the Utah legislature; 
and (2) non-scheduled air carriers are not subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Commission by operation of Sections 
54-4-1, 54-2-1(30) and 54-2-1(14). 
The legislature did not intend that the Commission 
regulate non-scheduled air carriers. Title 54 of the Utah 
Code Annotated was amended in 1969 by House Bill 244, 
passed during the 1969 Regular Session of the Utah State 
Legislature. This bill, as noted by appellant in Point II 
of its brief, was an act amending Sections 54-2-1 and 54-
4-25 of the Utah Code, adding aircraft carriers to the list 
of entities regulated by the Commission. As the act was 
originally written and introduced, it covered all air car-
riers, but it was amended on the floor upon its third and 
final reading immediately prior to its passage in the House 
by the insertion of the word f 'scheduled'' in what is now 
Section 54-2-1(14). The Journal of the House of Repre-
sentatives, State of Utah, 1969 Session, p. 831, reads in 
part as follows: 
H.B. No. 244 read the third time in full and placed 
on its final passage. On motion of Representative 
Darger, the report of the Committee on Business 
and Commerce with respect to H.B. No. 244 was 
adopted. 
12 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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On motion of Representative Reese, the bill [H.B. 
244} was amended as follows: 
Page 3, line 33, after the words automobile corpo-
ration; insert the word scheduled. 
* # # * 
H.B. No. 244 as amended, then passed on the fol-
lowing roll call. . . . 
A copy of H.B. 244 is included in the record, and it 
should be noted that the amendment on page 3 thereof 
altered what is now Section 54-2-1(14). An amendment 
to Section 54-4-25 to include aircraft carriers in the group 
of entities which must acquire Certificates of Convenience 
and Necessity was also part of the original H.B. 244, but 
this section was not amended on the floor. This failure to 
change what is now Section 54-4-25 at the time that Sec-
tion 54-2-1(14) was amended on the floor of the house is 
the basic cause of this entire lawsuit, since Section 54-2-1-
(14) following the floor amendment, refers to "scheduled" 
air carriers only in defining the term common carrier, 
while Section 54-4-25 refers to all air carriers in requiring 
Certificates of Public Convenience and Necessity. 
No record exists of any discussions by members of 
the 1969 legislature regarding H. B. 244, but two of the 
sponsors of this bill filed affidavits with the Commission 
concerning the "legislative intent" in passing this bill, 
which affidavits are included in the record on pages 81 
and 82. These affidavits, one filed by D. Leon Reese, the 
man who made the floor amendment adding the word 
"scheduled", and the other by Richard Carling, a co-spon-
sor of H.B. 244, both indicate that the intent of the floor 
13 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
amendment was to limit the coverage of H.B. 244 to 
scheduled air carriers only, and the failure to so amend 
what is now Section 54-4-25 by adding the word "sched-
uled" was merely an oversight. 
In addition to the fact that the legislative intent in 
passing House Bill 244 was to regulate only scheduled 
air carriers, even without knowing the intent of the legis-
lature it is apparent that non-scheduled air carriers are 
not subject to the authority of the Commission. The Pub-
lic Service Commission's powers are granted by statute, 
and no expansion of those powers beyond the particular 
limitations of the jurisdictional statute is permissible. 1 
Am. Jur. 2d, Administrative Law, Section 70, states in 
part as follows: 
Administrative agencies are creatures of statute 
and their power is dependent upon statutes, so that 
they must find within the statute warrant for the 
exercise of any authority which they claim. 
Section 54-4-1, U.C.A., is the broad, general grant 
of power to the Commission and vests the Commission with 
power over "public utilities.,, As appellant has pointed 
out earlier in this brief, public utilities include common 
carriers, but common carriers do not include non-sched-
uled aircraft carriers. Section 54-4-25, by requiring cer-
tificates of convenience and necessity of all aircraft car-
riers, cannot expand the basic jurisdiction of the P.S.C. 
where Section 54-4-1 does not grant such jurisdiction in 
the first place. The P.S.C. may obtain jurisdiction only by 
statute, and if the basic jurisdiction does not exist, a spe-
cific statute requiring a certain act may not confer such 
jurisdiction. In other words, Section 54-4-25 does not 
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grant jurisdiction; it only provides that certain entities 
must perform a particular act. The statute which grants 
jurisdiction, Section 54-4-1, does not by definition, grant 
jurisdiction over non-scheduled carriers. Therefore, the 
requirement that an entity over which the Commission 
has no jurisdiction perform a certain act (i.e., obtain a 
Certificate of Convenience and Necessity) is simply mean-
ingless or at best unenforceable, since no power to regu-
late that entity in any way exists in the first place. 
In addition to the fact that the Commission possesses 
no basic grant of jurisdiction to regulate non-scheduled 
air carriers in the first place, a careful reading of Section 
54-4-25 indicates that Certificates of Convenience and 
Necessity must be obtained by entities which engage in 
scheduled, regular, consistent carriage of persons and 
materials only. When surplus verbiage is deleted from 
Section 54-4-25 and the relevant words of the statute stand 
alone, the statute provides that: 
No . . . aircraft carrier (corporation) . . . shall 
henceforth establish . . . [a} line, route . . . or 
system or any extension [thereof] . . . without 
having first obtained {a Certificate of Convenience 
and Necessity} 
The service provided by Dinaland could not be desig-
nated a "line" since this term, in the context of Section 
54-4-25, clearly refers to such things as telephone lines, 
pipelines and waterlines. 
The term "system" is also inapplicable to non-sched-
uled air carriers since this word connotes a regular or 
orderly setup of some sort; Dinaland's operation is com-
pletely irregular and it has no systematic procedure which 
is followed. 
15 
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As for the word "route", it simply does not apply to 
the flights made by non-scheduled air carriers. No definite 
and regular routes are flown, and the distance and direc-
tion of each flight differs according to the desires of the 
particular customer. 
On the other hand, the words "route" and "system" 
are very applicable to scheduled air carriers, since they do 
indeed engage in systematic, orderly, regular flights fol-
lowing the same route, traveling to the same points, and 
departing and arriving at the same times consistently. 
Therefore, it is apparent that the intent of Section 54-4-25 
was and is to regulate, aside from railroads, telephone, 
telegraph, gas and electric companies, only those types 
of entities which engage in providing regular, scheduled, 
continuous service to the public, and not to regulate the 
sporadic and unpredictable business of non-scheduled air 
taxi service. 
POINT IV 
NON-SCHEDULED AIR CARRIERS IN UTAH 
ARE SUBJECT TO SPECIFIC REGULATION 
BY THE AERONAUTICS BOARD; REGULA-
TION BY THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMIS-
SION WOULD BE DUPLICITOUS AND 
WASTEFUL 
Non-scheduled air carriers such as appellants will not 
escape regulation by the State of Utah if the Commission 
does not regulate them; the Utah State Aeronautics Board 
exercises substantial control over such operations under 
the authority of the Utah Aeronautical Regulatory Act, 
(Title 2, Chapter 4, U.C.A. 1953). 
16 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The Aeronautical Regulatory Act has, since 1961, 
defined a "commercial flight operation" as "the carrying 
of persons or goods for hire, including the conducting of 
flight instruction for compensation." (Section 2-1-1(31), 
U.C.A. 1953). Under the authority of this act, the Aero-
nautics Board has adopted regulations for all commercial 
flight operators in Utah; appellants are subject to these 
regulations in all respects. These regulations provide, 
among other things, that flight operators are to register 
annually with the Division of Aeronautics and are to carry 
public liability and property damage insurance, including 
coverage for aircraft passengers. All persons seeking to 
engage in commercial flight operations in Utah are re-
quired to apply for and obtain a commercial operator's 
certificate and meet the requirements of the above regula-
tions. 
To require non-scheduled air carriers to also obtain 
certificates of convenience and necessity from another 
regulatory agency like the Commission would result in un-
necessary duplicity of government expense and regulation. 
C O N C L U S I O N 
Respondent Flaming Gorge Flying Service has point-
ed out in this brief that Respondent Dinaland Aviation is a 
non-scheduled air carrier and that, contrary to appellant's 
assertions, this term does indeed have some specific legal 
significance. Respondent has also shown that the 1969 
Amendments to Title 54 of the Utah Code were intended 
to subject only scheduled air carriers to the authority of 
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the Public Service Commission, and therefore, Dinaland 
Aviation is not required to obtain a Certificate of Con-
venience and Necessity from the Commission. 
For these reasons, it is respectfully urged that this 
court sustain the Findings of the Public Service Commis-
sion and hold that non-scheduled intrastate air carriers 
are not subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT W. BRANDT 
BRANDT, MILLER, NELSON 
& CHRISTOPHERSON 
716 Newhouse Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellee 
Flaming Gorge Flying Service 
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